Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:ARAPHEL:JACOON:SO
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 130875

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, IR, PK, US

SUBJECT: IRANIAN COOPERATION IN PAKISTAN REPROCESSING PROBLEM

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 4692; (B) ISLAMABAD 4902

1. WE AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION IN REF A THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO INFORM THE SHAH IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT OUR PROPOSED PACKAGE. YOU MAY THEREFORE TELL HIM THAT IF THE FRENCH CANCEL THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT, WE ARE CONTEM-PLATING AN ASSISTANCE PACKAGE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN BOTH

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ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SALES COMPONENTS TO BE OFFERED TO PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO DISSUADE IT FROM MOVING AHEAD ON ITS OWN TO CONSTRUCT A REPROCESSING FACILITY OF ANY KIND. FYI. WE DO NOT ENVISAGE USING THE PACKAGE AS A LEVER TO PERSUADE PAKISTAN TO BREAK THE FRENCH CONTRACT SINCE WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY ISLAMABAD (REF B) THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND SURVIVE POLITICALLY.

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WE CANNOT BE MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS TIME ON THE CONTENTS OF THE PACKAGE SINCE IT IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE. HOWEVER, WE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN GREATER DETAIL AFTER WE TOUCH BASE WITH THE FRENCH, SINCE IRAN MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION. END FYI.

2. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE REPROCESSING QUESTION WILL BE EASY WHETHER OR NOT THE BHUTTO ISSUE IS NEUTRALIZED. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY ISLAMABAD (REF B), THAT IF THE CONTRACT IS CANCELLED, THERE WILL BE "AN ALMIGHTY FUSS". IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE NEED THE SHAH'S HELP AND COLLABORATION IN DISSUADING THE GOP FROM MOVING AHEAD ON ITS OWN, THUS MAKING IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF SUPPORT WHICH PAKISTAN SO BADLY NEEDS AT THIS JUNCTURE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF AFGHAN EVENTS.

3. YOU MAY TELL THE SHAH THAT WE FULLY RECOGNIZE INDIA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE EQUATION. PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATION IN SEEKING REPROCESSING CAPABILITY LARGELY DERIVES FROM INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POTENTIAL AS WELL AS ITS CONVENTIONAL ARMS SUPERIORITY. ACCEPTANCE BY INDIA OF SAFEGUARDS ON ADDITIONAL FACILITIES, FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, OR A CTB WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REASSURANCE TO PAKISTAN CONCERNING THE LONG-TERM PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, BEYOND PRIME MINI-

STER DESAI'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION FOR INDIA. DESAI HAS INDICATED THAT INDIA WOULD ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES ONLY IF THREE PRE-CONDITIONS WERE MET - SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY (CTB) BY US, UK AND USSR, A US/USSR CEILING ON FURTHER PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND A US/USSR AGREEMENT TO THE PHASED ELIMINATION OF EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES.

4. THE NEW NU-LEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT PROHIBITS US NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. HOWEVER, UNDER THE ACT WE HAVE TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS BEFORE THE NUCLEAR EXPORT PROHIBITION COMES INTO EFFECT. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO SHIP FUEL FOR THE TARAPUR REACTORS IN ORDER NOT TO CLOSE THE DOOR ON OUR CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS; THIS APPROVAL IS NOW BEFORE CONGRESS FOR SIXTY DAYS. THOUGH ACHIEVEMENT OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS WILL BE DIFFICULT AND CANNOT BE ASSURED, WE ARE ENGAGED IN CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON THIS MATTER, AND IT IS LIKELY TO BE THE PRINCIPAL ITEM CONSIDERED DURING PRIME MINISTER DESAI'S EARLY JUNE VISIT

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TO THE STATES.

5. GIVEN THE INDIAN PRE-CONDITIONS, THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOI WILL AGREE TO FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXCLUDE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE IN THE TWENTY-FOUR MONTH PERIOD NOTED ABOVE. INDIA HAS ALSO REJECTED A PAKISTANI PRO-

POSAL FOR A SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (SANWFZ), PRIMARILY ON THE GROUNDS THE ZONE IS TOO NARROWLY DEFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY. FYI. IF MODELED ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ZONE, SANWFZ WOULD ALSO INVOLVE A COMMITMENT TO FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. LAST FALL AT THE UNGA THE US VOTED IN FAVOR OF A PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON SANWFZ. END FYI.
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6. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN HAS MADE A MORE LIMITED PROPOSAL WHICH CONCEIVABLY MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SHAH MIGHT WELL PLAY A VERY USEFUL ROLE. EARLY LAST YEAR THE PAKISTANIS SOUNDED OUT THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES (APPARENTLY SRI LANKA, NEPAL, BANGLADESH, AND BHUTAN, AS WELL AS INDIA), PROPOSING A JOINT DECLARATION PLEDGING THAT NONE OF THEM WOULD DEVELOP OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AGHA SHAHI TOLD THE SECRETARY LAST OCTOBER THAT INDIA'S NEIGHBORS WERE ALL IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSAL AND THAT VAJPAYEE HAD AT LEAST AGREED TO LOOK INTO IT. THE PROPOSAL REALLY GOES NO FURTHER THAN DESAI'S PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, BUT WOULD INCORPORATE THEM INTO A JOINT DECLARATION.

7. NOTING THAT THE INDIANS GREATLY VALUE THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN, YOU MAY RAISE WITH THE SHAH THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS PRESSING THIS PROPOSAL IN DELHI. KNOWING THE SHAH'S STRONG VIEWS ON PROLIFERATION, HE MIGHT EVEN WISH TO SUGGEST THE INCLUSION OF IRAN IN THE JOINT DECLARATION TO MAKE IT MORE PALATABLE TO THE INDIANS. SUCH A JOINT DECLARATION WOULD PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH SOME ASSURANCE, HOWEVER SLIGHT, ON INDIAN NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, PERHAPS GIVE THE GOP A "FACE-SAVING" ACHIEVEMENT TO USE PUBLICLY IF THE REPROCESSING PLANT GOES BY THE BOARD. VANCE

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